"Land Matters"
by Russell Cash
Originally Submitted On 04/23/2013 - EKU
Part 6 - The Land Dispute / Conclusion
Turning our attention back to the land dispute, the former content was provided to illustrate the similar aspirations and dynamics facing both the Jews and Palestinians and their contrasting reactions in response to the events unfolding in the world. Although the US had some influence on Zionist politics, Woodrow Wilson asserted it was American policy to recognize the right to self-determination in the area. “President Woodrow Wilson declared that the principle of self-determination should govern any postwar reorganization of territories that were formerly controlled by the Ottoman Empire.” (Dershowitz, 2004) Therefore, one might conclude the Jews were more determined to establish and govern themselves more so than the Palestinians. After all, policy after policy, whether Turkish, Egyptian, British, or eventually Israeli, the Palestinians have rarely and effectively mobilized efforts against the displacement of land when opportunities presented themselves to do so.
The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 intended to carry out two new policies. The first was to establish a local relationship between the government and its residents in order to better influence and control the daily lives of its citizens. The second was to enforce a system of taxation and registration on the land in Ottoman possession. “The most emphasized goals in this context are curbing the power of intermediaries between the state and the peasants, whether they be local notables, large landlords or tribal leaders and maintaining ownership of arable land and taxing each plot.” (Ayteki˙n, 2009) While the code gave the Ottoman’s better control of the land, there were many flaws and pre-existing customs, which complicated land ownership for the fellahin, their lives, and drastically contributed to the dispossession of their land.
Land ownership was largely based on cultivation. Villagers could acquire land by moving onto free land (uncultivated), and eventually assume what was considered rights to the land by improving it. However, much of the land, prior to the Egyptian and Zionist influence, was desolate, remote, considered unworkable, and vulnerable to the daily attacks of the Bedouin marauders. Because of this, rarely did an individual or small group of fellahin acquire land this way. It took a larger collaborative effort similar to that of a village with the support of a clan or notable family for resources and security.
Instead the fellahin villages depended on a system of ownership referred to as Musha’ land, which was land collectively owned by the villagers. In order to ensure fairness and that no one village family became more powerful than the others based on property, the fellahin would rotate the area of land they farmed every two years. Essentially, the fellahin had the collective rights to the land but did not own an individual plot for themselves. This method of ownership was intended to be addressed under the land code but it only complicated matters. “The unintentional consequence of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 was the opening up of agricultural land for buying and selling.” (Apter, 2011)
Ironically, the Land Code could have helped the fellahin but most chose not to acknowledge the code for various reasons. “The Code recognized private property on land, significantly enlarged liberties of landholders, pushed inheritance rules further towards gender equality, and included some clauses that favored landed interests.” (Apter, 2011)
Under the land code the fellahin could acquire land in two ways. As cited from the Hope-Simpson Report, “Partition can be made in one of two ways, either by agreement among the parties and acceptance of that agreement by the Courts, or by the Courts themselves.” (Zionism) While the former option would have been easier to the fellahin, in reality there was no way of dodging the courts and expenses required. This is so because there was previously no traditional way of recording titles to land. Many of the titles were in the names of departed family members or distant relatives and not in the names of the current landholder. In order for the code to be effective, titles had to be clear and in the names of the rightful owner. Thus, if not previously done so, the land had to be registered and a 3% tax based on the value of the property had to be paid. However, although it rarely occurred, if the title was clear, it was a matter of unanimous consent among the villagers to sign over a partition and the approval of the court.
Still, problems persisted for the fellahin. One of the reasons they avoided the land registration was to avoid conscription into the Ottoman Army. Also, most of the fellahin were in debt and could not afford the additional 3% tax and other costs of registration. Another requirement that limited property acquisition was a survey of the land. Palestinian land was forever loosely governed. Property lines consisted of geographic land features such as a large bolder, a stream, or other vague overlapping landmarks. The need for a survey only added to the fellahin’s costs. Therefore, the fellahin resorted back to the Musha’ system of ownership in the meantime, which eventually faded.
The problems the Musha’ system presented to the Ottoman’s was that due to the two year land rotation, no development was possible. This meant large tracts of agricultural lands were never improved for crop rotation, replanting of trees etc. In one part, the land code wished to dissolve the Musha’ system and eventually did. As the code required land to be registered and because the fellahin were apprehensive to do so, this meant the property of entire villages would often be registered, by questionable means, to ruling clans, notables living inside the cities, and many Arabs living outside the land of Palestine, who in many cases had no ties to the agricultural settlements. “After this occurred, the family farmers continued in possession-as tenants-and considered themselves to retain their customary right to the land, although that was no longer legally the case.” (Quigley, 2005)
Jews acquired most of their land from absentee landlords. These were often Arab land owners living outside of Palestine. “The Palestine to which the European Jews of the First Aliyah immigrated was vastly under populated, and the land onto which the Jews moved was, in fact, bought primarily from absentee landlords and real estate speculators.” (Dershowitz, 2004) While there is rarely any dispute that Jews purchased most of their land in this manner, what remains questionable is how many Palestinians were displaced and who is to blame. “Jews bought only large tracts, almost never small farms from an occupier-owner.” (Schneer, 2012) Most of the lands the Jews purchased were along the coastal plains and some of it was equivalent to swamp land. While many pro-Israeli scholars argue that very few Palestinians lived on the land purchased by the Jews, other pro-Palestinians argue otherwise. “Most of this land was tilled by farmers whose families had held it for generations with possessory rights recognized by customary law.” (Quigley, 2005) While the true number may never be realized, it was not inconceivable for an Arab absentee landlord to sell a tract of land possibly displacing tens of thousands of Palestinians in one transaction. “According to land purchase records, many (absentee landlords) lived in Beirut or Damascus, and some were tax collectors and merchants living elsewhere … who had no connection to the land and who often exploited the local workers or fellahin.” (Dershowitz, 2004)
“By 1914 Jews had purchased 130,000 acres, of which 90,000 were under cultivation in twenty-six separate colonies.” (Schneer, 2012) The increase in the value of the land also offset the local economy, which overflowed into the emerging tension between those affected by the changes. In some places, previously uncultivated land sold for close to ten times its value. Finally, the Arab villagers began to assemble. “At various locations in northern Palestine Arab farmers refused to move from land the Fund purchased from absentee owners, and Turkish authorities, at the Jewish National Fund's request, evicted them .… Arabs formed societies in Jerusalem and Nablus to raise funds to purchase land that might otherwise be sold to Zionists …. In Haifa Arabs formed a society in 1910 to lobby Turkey to prohibit land sales to Zionists and ... in 1914 Arabs in Tiberius protested when settlers tried to buy the Huleh marshes.” (Quigley, 2005) Unfortunately this has been the typical political reaction by most Palestinians even up to the present day. The only policy that appears to work for the Palestinians is the policy to deny the Jewish people a right to exist in Palestine. Even the current Hamas Charter, which controls Gaza, according to their interpretation of the Koran, makes it illegal and punishable by death for a Muslim to sell a Jew property or assist those who do. About 90 people have been put to death so far for committing this crime.
Eventually 700,000 Palestinians would go into refuge after the outbreak of the Israeli War of Independence during 1947-1949. The majority would claim that they were illegally dispossessed of their land. Part of the claimed dispossession is due to land purchases previously discussed. Another portion can be blamed on the attacking Arab nations who encouraged the Palestinians to seek refuge in neighboring Arab countries during the war promising the right of return. Simultaneously, close to one million Jews were kicked out of the neighboring Arab countries they had previously resided in, now seeking refuge in Israel. The difference is none of the Arab nations absorbed the Palestinian refugees as they promised and to this day they are still living in refuge.
–In conclusion, a great philosopher once said that all men were “political animals”. (Aristotle, 350 BCE) This couldn’t be truer than in the Middle East. When organic ideologies, deep spiritual convictions, and even nationalist aspirations are acted upon and brought into reality, they become political. As the identity of one group presses upon another, man naturally finds himself in that reactionary state. While Jews and Palestinians both share in the essential components needed for nation building, the Jews politically out maneuvered the Palestinians. At the time, the British had no real clear policy regarding Palestine. When they occupied it, they spent more time commissioning reports trying to understand the native population and how to govern them rather than making policy. What policies they did make often augmented previous Ottoman policy, such as the Ottoman Land Code of 1848. When the Palestinians could have acted they didn’t and when they did, it was often reactionary to what the Jews were doing. As time passed, the Jews gained momentum becoming more self-supportive while the Palestinians waited on the other Arab nations to act on their behalf, instead of placing pressure on the British and allied governments. “The village mentality ... was essentially defensive …. The offensive, which required stocks of arms and ammunition, logistics, organization and effective military leadership and doctrine, was alien to the Palestinian Arab fellahin. … By contrast, the Jewish settlements … were inhabited by the most politically advanced and committed elements of the Jewish population.” (Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949, 1989) Despite political efforts, technological advances, and partisan values, something has to be said for how people spend their time. In this case, Jews were quicker to govern themselves, long before they were a nation, more so than were the Palestinians.
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