"Land Matters"
by Russell Cash
Originally Submitted On 04/23/2013 - EKU
Part 5 - The British Influence
With existing relationships between Weizmann and Lord Balfour, the British could no longer hide behind duplicit promises and ambiguity. For years the British had been cautious of the French. Prime Minister Lloyd George had vocalized his wishes for Palestine not to fall into the hands of the French. Some speculate that the British did not want France too close to the Suez Canal and meddling in their affairs in Egypt. Others speculate, it was Weizmann whom the British did not want to lose favor with. After all he was, in their eyes, a genius chemist whose research had helped their military. Also, “Britain wanted to build a pipeline from Arabian oil fields west to Haifa.” (Quigley, 2005) More commonly, the British saw the Zionists and Jews as a key asset; one of wealth that was not merely measured in money but one well worth keeping. “The British never believed that the Jews alone could alter the balance of the war, but they did come to believe that the Jews could help fund it; and perhaps more important, they could persuade mightier forces to weigh in or out or to stand firm.” (Schneer, 2012)
Likewise, the British appeared to have no real grasp on what to do with Palestine once WWI was over. They had already promised parts of it to Hussein of Mecca, who had successfully raised a militia of 20,000 men to lead the Arab Revolt of 1917, which helped the British defeat the Turks. In secret, British official Sykes was meeting with French politician Picot drafting the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which pretentiously drew out the borders of the future Palestine, giving much of the ruling power over to the international community. Also, the British were considering a truce with the Ottomans in which they would relinquish control of Palestine back into the hands of the Turks. Simultaneously, Weizmann was meeting with Lord Balfour pressing for a national Jewish homeland in Palestine and no one seemed to know what other deals were being made.
The main point, however, is that the Arabs did not send officials to Britain to negotiate terms of the McMahon-Huessein correspondence nor stay on top of key political issues taking place in both regions. Instead everything was discussed somewhat in secret and through letters. Although both Sykes and McMahon most likely knew about the dual promises to the Jews and Arabs, correspondence between Hussein and the two was centralized and did not have the same effect as many European Zionists collaborating aggressively to pressure the establishment of the state of Israel. Better diplomatic efforts were never initiated, continual political pressure was never applied, and lack of organization and mobilization was useless as all communication was quarantined to Hussein and his sons. Realizing the Arab situation was different and the costs of working with the British could be detrimental, Hussein was more concerned about his future title as being crowned King and not thinking practical, nor taking the opinion of his future subjects into account. Even in the Palestinian world today, scholars note the repetitive pattern, With respect to the PLO, “[L]eadership itself became far too concerned with its own survival, not enough with learning from the past, capitalizing and building on strength and potential, remaining focused on principles (like freedom and equality for Palestinians) and real goals, mobilizing its people and their best elements for work in a common cause.” (Said, 1995)
Upon its consent in 1917, the Balfour Declaration solidified the hopes of many Jews. The declaration recognized the need for a Jewish homeland in Palestine, the preservation of civil and religious rights of non-Jews in Palestine, and the freedoms enjoyed by Jews worldwide in hopes of not provoking an outbreak of anti-Semitism. The Balfour Declaration would serve, in effect, as a charter for the establishment of the state of Israel. Although much more could be said about the declaration, once it was recognized and referenced in other policies and treaties, it became an internationally binding document. For the Jews, it was a moment of victory and liberation. But for the Palestinians, it would be another “thorn in the side”; a moment of history they could not neglect and at some point would have to confront. “Ironically, one of the biggest objections many Arabs had to the Balfour Declaration was that it seemed to regard Palestine as a separate entity rather than as part of Syria.” (Dershowitz, 2004)
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