The Israeli / Palestinian Conflict - Part 6

The Israeli / Palestinian Conflict
"Land Matters"
by Russell Cash
Originally Submitted On 04/23/2013 - EKU

Part 6 - The Land Dispute / Conclusion

Turning our attention back to the land dispute, the former content was provided to illustrate the similar aspirations and dynamics facing both the Jews and Palestinians and their contrasting reactions in response to the events unfolding in the world. Although the US had some influence on Zionist politics, Woodrow Wilson asserted it was American policy to recognize the right to self-determination in the area. “President Woodrow Wilson declared that the principle of self-determination should govern any postwar reorganization of territories that were formerly controlled by the Ottoman Empire.” (Dershowitz, 2004) Therefore, one might conclude the Jews were more determined to establish and govern themselves more so than the Palestinians. After all, policy after policy, whether Turkish, Egyptian, British, or eventually Israeli, the Palestinians have rarely and effectively mobilized efforts against the displacement of land when opportunities presented themselves to do so.

The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 intended to carry out two new policies. The first was to establish a local relationship between the government and its residents in order to better influence and control the daily lives of its citizens. The second was to enforce a system of taxation and registration on the land in Ottoman possession. “The most emphasized goals in this context are curbing the power of intermediaries between the state and the peasants, whether they be local notables, large landlords or tribal leaders and maintaining ownership of arable land and taxing each plot.” (Ayteki˙n, 2009) While the code gave the Ottoman’s better control of the land, there were many flaws and pre-existing customs, which complicated land ownership for the fellahin, their lives, and drastically contributed to the dispossession of their land.

Land ownership was largely based on cultivation. Villagers could acquire land by moving onto free land (uncultivated), and eventually assume what was considered rights to the land by improving it. However, much of the land, prior to the Egyptian and Zionist influence, was desolate, remote, considered unworkable, and vulnerable to the daily attacks of the Bedouin marauders. Because of this, rarely did an individual or small group of fellahin acquire land this way. It took a larger collaborative effort similar to that of a village with the support of a clan or notable family for resources and security.

Instead the fellahin villages depended on a system of ownership referred to as Musha’ land, which was land collectively owned by the villagers. In order to ensure fairness and that no one village family became more powerful than the others based on property, the fellahin would rotate the area of land they farmed every two years. Essentially, the fellahin had the collective rights to the land but did not own an individual plot for themselves. This method of ownership was intended to be addressed under the land code but it only complicated matters. “The unintentional consequence of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 was the opening up of agricultural land for buying and selling.” (Apter, 2011)

Ironically, the Land Code could have helped the fellahin but most chose not to acknowledge the code for various reasons. “The Code recognized private property on land, significantly enlarged liberties of landholders, pushed inheritance rules further towards gender equality, and included some clauses that favored landed interests.” (Apter, 2011)

Under the land code the fellahin could acquire land in two ways. As cited from the Hope-Simpson Report, “Partition can be made in one of two ways, either by agreement among the parties and acceptance of that agreement by the Courts, or by the Courts themselves.” (Zionism) While the former option would have been easier to the fellahin, in reality there was no way of dodging the courts and expenses required. This is so because there was previously no traditional way of recording titles to land. Many of the titles were in the names of departed family members or distant relatives and not in the names of the current landholder. In order for the code to be effective, titles had to be clear and in the names of the rightful owner. Thus, if not previously done so, the land had to be registered and a 3% tax based on the value of the property had to be paid. However, although it rarely occurred, if the title was clear, it was a matter of unanimous consent among the villagers to sign over a partition and the approval of the court.

Still, problems persisted for the fellahin. One of the reasons they avoided the land registration was to avoid conscription into the Ottoman Army. Also, most of the fellahin were in debt and could not afford the additional 3% tax and other costs of registration. Another requirement that limited property acquisition was a survey of the land. Palestinian land was forever loosely governed. Property lines consisted of geographic land features such as a large bolder, a stream, or other vague overlapping landmarks. The need for a survey only added to the fellahin’s costs. Therefore, the fellahin resorted back to the Musha’ system of ownership in the meantime, which eventually faded.

The problems the Musha’ system presented to the Ottoman’s was that due to the two year land rotation, no development was possible. This meant large tracts of agricultural lands were never improved for crop rotation, replanting of trees etc. In one part, the land code wished to dissolve the Musha’ system and eventually did. As the code required land to be registered and because the fellahin were apprehensive to do so, this meant the property of entire villages would often be registered, by questionable means, to ruling clans, notables living inside the cities, and many Arabs living outside the land of Palestine, who in many cases had no ties to the agricultural settlements. “After this occurred, the family farmers continued in possession-as tenants-and considered themselves to retain their customary right to the land, although that was no longer legally the case.” (Quigley, 2005)

Jews acquired most of their land from absentee landlords. These were often Arab land owners living outside of Palestine. “The Palestine to which the European Jews of the First Aliyah immigrated was vastly under populated, and the land onto which the Jews moved was, in fact, bought primarily from absentee landlords and real estate speculators.” (Dershowitz, 2004) While there is rarely any dispute that Jews purchased most of their land in this manner, what remains questionable is how many Palestinians were displaced and who is to blame. “Jews bought only large tracts, almost never small farms from an occupier-owner.” (Schneer, 2012) Most of the lands the Jews purchased were along the coastal plains and some of it was equivalent to swamp land. While many pro-Israeli scholars argue that very few Palestinians lived on the land purchased by the Jews, other pro-Palestinians argue otherwise. “Most of this land was tilled by farmers whose families had held it for generations with possessory rights recognized by customary law.” (Quigley, 2005)  While the true number may never be realized, it was not inconceivable for an Arab absentee landlord to sell a tract of land possibly displacing tens of thousands of Palestinians in one transaction. “According to land purchase records, many (absentee landlords) lived in Beirut or Damascus, and some were tax collectors and merchants living elsewhere … who had no connection to the land and who often exploited the local workers or fellahin.” (Dershowitz, 2004)

“By 1914 Jews had purchased 130,000 acres, of which 90,000 were under cultivation in twenty-six separate colonies.” (Schneer, 2012) The increase in the value of the land also offset the local economy, which overflowed into the emerging tension between those affected by the changes. In some places, previously uncultivated land sold for close to ten times its value. Finally, the Arab villagers began to assemble. “At various locations in northern Palestine Arab farmers refused to move from land the Fund purchased from absentee owners, and Turkish authorities, at the Jewish National Fund's request, evicted them .… Arabs formed societies in Jerusalem and Nablus to raise funds to purchase land that might otherwise be sold to Zionists …. In Haifa Arabs formed a society in 1910 to lobby Turkey to prohibit land sales to Zionists and ... in 1914 Arabs in Tiberius protested when settlers tried to buy the Huleh marshes.” (Quigley, 2005) Unfortunately this has been the typical political reaction by most Palestinians even up to the present day. The only policy that appears to work for the Palestinians is the policy to deny the Jewish people a right to exist in Palestine. Even the current Hamas Charter, which controls Gaza, according to their interpretation of the Koran, makes it illegal and punishable by death for a Muslim to sell a Jew property or assist those who do. About 90 people have been put to death so far for committing this crime.

Eventually 700,000 Palestinians would go into refuge after the outbreak of the Israeli War of Independence during 1947-1949. The majority would claim that they were illegally dispossessed of their land. Part of the claimed dispossession is due to land purchases previously discussed. Another portion can be blamed on the attacking Arab nations who encouraged the Palestinians to seek refuge in neighboring Arab countries during the war promising the right of return. Simultaneously, close to one million Jews were kicked out of the neighboring Arab countries they had previously resided in, now seeking refuge in Israel. The difference is none of the Arab nations absorbed the Palestinian refugees as they promised and to this day they are still living in refuge.

–In conclusion, a great philosopher once said that all men were “political animals”. (Aristotle, 350 BCE) This couldn’t be truer than in the Middle East. When organic ideologies, deep spiritual convictions, and even nationalist aspirations are acted upon and brought into reality, they become political. As the identity of one group presses upon another, man naturally finds himself in that reactionary state. While Jews and Palestinians both share in the essential components needed for nation building, the Jews politically out maneuvered the Palestinians. At the time, the British had no real clear policy regarding Palestine. When they occupied it, they spent more time commissioning reports trying to understand the native population and how to govern them rather than making policy. What policies they did make often augmented previous Ottoman policy, such as the Ottoman Land Code of 1848. When the Palestinians could have acted they didn’t and when they did, it was often reactionary to what the Jews were doing. As time passed, the Jews gained momentum becoming more self-supportive while the Palestinians waited on the other Arab nations to act on their behalf, instead of placing pressure on the British and allied governments. “The village mentality ... was essentially defensive …. The offensive, which required stocks of arms and ammunition, logistics, organization and effective military leadership and doctrine, was alien to the Palestinian Arab fellahin. … By contrast, the Jewish settlements … were inhabited by the most politically advanced and committed elements of the Jewish population.” (Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949, 1989)  Despite political efforts, technological advances, and partisan values, something has to be said for how people spend their time. In this case, Jews were quicker to govern themselves, long before they were a nation, more so than were the Palestinians.



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The Israeli / Palestinian Conflict - Part 5

The Israeli / Palestinian Conflict
"Land Matters"
by Russell Cash
Originally Submitted On 04/23/2013 - EKU

Part 5 - The British Influence

With existing relationships between Weizmann and Lord Balfour, the British could no longer hide behind duplicit promises and ambiguity. For years the British had been cautious of the French. Prime Minister Lloyd George had vocalized his wishes for Palestine not to fall into the hands of the French. Some speculate that the British did not want France too close to the Suez Canal and meddling in their affairs in Egypt. Others speculate, it was Weizmann whom the British did not want to lose favor with. After all he was, in their eyes, a genius chemist whose research had helped their military. Also, “Britain wanted to build a pipeline from Arabian oil fields west to Haifa.” (Quigley, 2005)  More commonly, the British saw the Zionists and Jews as a key asset; one of wealth that was not merely measured in money but one well worth keeping. “The British never believed that the Jews alone could alter the balance of the war, but they did come to believe that the Jews could help fund it; and perhaps more important, they could persuade mightier forces to weigh in or out or to stand firm.” (Schneer, 2012)

Likewise, the British appeared to have no real grasp on what to do with Palestine once WWI was over. They had already promised parts of it to Hussein of Mecca, who had successfully raised a militia of 20,000 men to lead the Arab Revolt of 1917, which helped the British defeat the Turks. In secret, British official Sykes was meeting with French politician Picot drafting the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which pretentiously drew out the borders of the future Palestine, giving much of the ruling power over to the international community. Also, the British were considering a truce with the Ottomans in which they would relinquish control of Palestine back into the hands of the Turks. Simultaneously, Weizmann was meeting with Lord Balfour pressing for a national Jewish homeland in Palestine and no one seemed to know what other deals were being made.

The main point, however, is that the Arabs did not send officials to Britain to negotiate terms of the McMahon-Huessein correspondence nor stay on top of key political issues taking place in both regions. Instead everything was discussed somewhat in secret and through letters. Although both Sykes and McMahon most likely knew about the dual promises to the Jews and Arabs, correspondence between Hussein and the two was centralized and did not have the same effect as many European Zionists collaborating aggressively to pressure the establishment of the state of Israel. Better diplomatic efforts were never initiated, continual political pressure was never applied, and lack of organization and mobilization was useless as all communication was quarantined to Hussein and his sons. Realizing the Arab situation was different and the costs of working with the British could be detrimental, Hussein was more concerned about his future title as being crowned King and not thinking practical, nor taking the opinion of his future subjects into account. Even in the Palestinian world today, scholars note the repetitive pattern, With respect to the PLO, “[L]eadership itself became far too concerned with its own survival, not enough with learning from the past, capitalizing and building on strength and potential, remaining focused on principles (like freedom and equality for Palestinians) and real goals, mobilizing its people and their best elements for work in a common cause.” (Said, 1995)

Upon its consent in 1917, the Balfour Declaration solidified the hopes of many Jews. The declaration recognized the need for a Jewish homeland in Palestine, the preservation of civil and religious rights of non-Jews in Palestine, and the freedoms enjoyed by Jews worldwide in hopes of not provoking an outbreak of anti-Semitism. The Balfour Declaration would serve, in effect, as a charter for the establishment of the state of Israel. Although much more could be said about the declaration, once it was recognized and referenced in other policies and treaties, it became an internationally binding document. For the Jews, it was a moment of victory and liberation. But for the Palestinians, it would be another “thorn in the side”; a moment of history they could not neglect and at some point would have to confront.  “Ironically, one of the biggest objections many Arabs had to the Balfour Declaration was that it seemed to regard Palestine as a separate entity rather than as part of Syria.” (Dershowitz, 2004)



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The Israeli / Palestinian Conflict - Part 4

The Israeli / Palestinian Conflict
"Land Matters"
by Russell Cash
Originally Submitted On 04/23/2013 - EKU

Part 4 - Jewish Zionism

Between 1840 and 1880 the Jewish population nearly doubled. Still the increase by itself was not enough to threaten the fellahin. As the Jews began purchasing large tracts of land on the coastal planes, not previously cultivated, their agricultural ambitions, at first, were proving unsuccessful. Jews underestimated the sacrifice needed to run an agricultural settlement in Palestine nor did they have the experience. However the desire to do so proved beneficial and strategic. The growing demand for citrus crops created an influx of workers to the area. Prior to Theodore Herzl, Zionist ambitions were to blend in with the Arab Palestinians and not necessarily dispossess them of their land. In fact, many Jews were afraid that if they did not benefit the Arab Palestinians in some way, they would view them as a threat and a wave of anti-Semitism would break out. Therefore, in the earlier periods, most Jews were willing to hire the fellahin, as they proved to be better fit for the environment and there was an increasing flow of work to keep them occupied. But as time progressed and the Jews bought more land and Zionism shifted its attention away from assimilation and more towards territory, hostilities began to emerge. Eventually the Jews began innovating new tools and techniques that were foreign to the fellahin. A later Zionist policy was that only Jews should work the land and prohibited the hiring of any Arab laborers. The jobs were going to the new Jewish immigrants who were also receiving a hirer wage for their labor. “The logical conclusion of this process was the separate development of the Arab and Jewish economies and, eventually, the creation of two separate nationalist movements.” (Kimmerling, 2003)

Like Arabism, Zionism first emerged as an ideology before becoming an aggressive political movement. Prior to the 1880’s, in which the first Aliyah took place, the number of Jews living in Palestine hardly constituted a threat to the existing Arab Palestinians, except in places of municipality, such as Jerusalem. However, the conflicts that arose in the major cities were mainly over religious and civil rights and not necessarily land ownership. A few pre-existing Jews, mostly non-European Jews, had created a few agricultural settlements outside the metropolitan areas and had acquired certain skills to work the land, which the white European Jews did not possess. “Aboriginal Palestinian Jews, farmers, had long established themselves in the town of Acre and were versed in both Arabic and Hebrew.” (Schneer, 2012)

Prior to the Russian pogroms, Zionism, at best, encompassed a small group of Jews that wished to preserve their already existing ties to the land of Palestine and one day blend in with the natives. Their plan was quite simple; support existing Jewish settlements in the form of money and resources, and progressively send new immigrants to either support the settlements or create new ones. Initially, the idea of reclaiming the land of Palestine as a national home for the Jews was a remote thought. However, as Zionist aspirations continued against the looming Russian pogroms, the holocaust of WWII, and the later Jewish influx of refugees to Israel, the need for a sovereign Jewish homeland appeared unavoidable and in some ways inevitable.

Had it not been for the Jewish Rothschild family, it is questionable if Zionism and the creation of modern Israel would have worked altogether. The Rothschild’s would provide a primary source of funding that would bridge the gap between the Jewish muscle and will to survive in Palestine with the British and western political backing necessary to legitimize the state. In fact, Theodore Herzl had originally requested the Rothschild’s to back his vision and plan for the new Zionist organization. However, he was turned down as the Rothschild’s were already committed to funding certain settlements in Palestine as previously noted. At the time, Herzl’s ambitions were seen as too aggressive and in fact, many Jews had yet to embrace the idea of a sovereign nation. Until then, the Rothschild’s had provided the necessary resources that essentially helped maintain and build Jewish infrastructure, which later added to their organizational impact on politics. “Their subventions provided the necessary cushion when crops did not grow, funds for equipment, tools, seeds, teachers, schools, doctors, administrators, and funds to purchase land.” (Schneer, 2012) Needless to say, such philanthropist activities were not available to the Palestinians. Instead, those who might have been capable of providing such assistance often took advantage of them exploiting their land.
By the later part of the 19th century, Zionism was starting to catch on in places where Jews were either motivated by nationalist aspirations or starting to feel the wave of anti-Semitism. Still, in other places, notably Britain, Zionism was not popular among many of the Jews until after WWI. As Theodore Herzl forged Zionism into a political effort, and even until after his death, there were mixed reactions to Zionism among Jews stemming from the many sub branches that quarreled for control. Nonetheless, the commencement of the first Aliyah had brought roughly 7,000 new Jewish immigrants to the land, “the largest number in a single year since the Romans had destroyed the Second Temple”. (Schneer, 2012)

As the Jewish population increased to around 30,000, it was the organizational efforts of Zionism that gave the Jews a leading edge that would last with them to the present day; not the desire to establish a homeland, at least not yet. “Most of the Jews of the First Aliyah had no realistic hope of establishing a Jewish nation in Palestine. … [T]here was no political movement advocating a Jewish state until near the• end of the First Aliyah in 1897, when Theodore Herzl organized the first Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland.” (Dershowitz, 2004) Yet, Zionism provided the basic necessities to expand Jewish society, such as schools, civil and industrial infrastructure, banks, areas of commerce, and the basis for a future political framework. Eventually, Zionism would be integrated in with every facet of the Jewish life, even if the Jews did not consider themselves true Zionists.

Although Theodore Herzl is often crowned as the father of Zionism, it wasn’t until after his death that his ambitious goals became a reality. One might say Herzl provided the momentum Zionism needed in order to gain political attention or it might have died out early on or taken an alternative route. Herzl’s main contribution, among others, was his aggressive efforts to organize and mobilize Zionism as a political movement. As long as it stayed in the forefront of the minds of Jews and politicians, much needed dialog and debate would figure out the details. As mentioned previously, many Jews found Herzl’s ideas rather risky. However, whether realized or not, Herzl would provide the philosophy that would ultimately come into being once the Zionist organization was put into action. For the most part, Herzl was a gadfly. He publicly vocalized what many Jewish Zionists were afraid to admit publicly. In reference to Palestinians he commented, “We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our own country. ... Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly.” (Quigley, 2005)

While Herzl provided the political framework, and Jews provided the spirit and will, Zionists in Britain, with the help of British officials and the Rothschild’s, added the final touch, solidifying Zionist ambitions in Israel and its demand for a national Jewish state. Prior to this however, Jews were still divided among four major camps, each promoted by well-known Jewish leaders and who had ties to the British parliament, as well as other prominent Jews around the world. Some scholars do not identify these sub branches as falling under Zionism, however for the sake of simplicity and because others do, this paper considers these branches with respect to Zionism. Originally, the Zionists in Britain split into two camps, the Territorials who wished for a Jewish national homeland supported by a major nation like Britain and the Practicals, who did not believe the movement could gain support of a superpower and instead wished to assimilate in with the native Palestinians. Eventually, these two camps would merge into a new camp referred to as Culturals. “They fashioned an alternative strategy to both territorial and political Zionism that emphasized building up Jewish society within Palestine as it was, and strengthening Jewish culture throughout the lands of the Diaspora.” (Schneer, 2012) Finally, there were the anti-Zionists who feared the Zionist ambitions would lead to a wave of anti-Semitism worldwide and strongly advocated against it. At some point during its evolution, each had a fundamental impact or played an integral role in forming modern Zionism.

Chaim Weizmann, a Russian born Jew and later the first President of Israel, was one of the most influential leaders of Zionism. By profession he was a well-known chemist whose expertise was in large demand in Britain. Weizmann developed a new way of creating acetone, which at the time was crucial to the coming war effort. Originally something of a Cultural later turned Territorial; Weizmann concentrated much of his early efforts to establishing educational institutions in Palestine. With the help of Albert Einstein they created Hebrew University in Jerusalem, one of the leading international schools in the world. As well, Technion, another university in Israel, honors Weizmann as their founder. He shared close ties with Ben Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel, who also has an institution named after him. Weizmann’s role as a Zionist leader in education and establishing institutions would prove beneficial as he would later help create the Palestinian Land Development Company (PLDC). With the help of the Rothschilds, the PLDC would unite with another organization, the National Jewish Fund (NJF). The NJF would acquire land purchase by the PLDC and attach certain stipulations to the land, such as only Jews could lease and work the land under the fund. “In 1901 the World Zionist Organization formed a company to buy land for Jewish settlers … in "Palestine, Syria, and other parts of Turkey in Asia and the Peninsula of Sinai … to redeem the land of Palestine as the inalienable possession of the Jewish people.” (Quigley, 2005) Such coordination exemplifies the organizational role of Zionism that kept the movement a step ahead of its competitors.

By the mid part of his career as a Zionist, Weizmann took center stage as he assumed leadership status among the Zionists and created key relationships with important British officials, predominantly Lord Balfour. That is not to say Weizmann and Zionism did not come with its challenges. In fact, Weizmann, like many, changed his attitudes towards Zionist goals and eventually realized the only way the Jewish people could truly be sovereign is if they had their own homeland in Palestine. However, unlike Arab leaders, European Zionists, despite oppositions towards one another, were quick to assemble, negotiate, and seek diplomatic solutions to pressing obstacles. In retrospect, the final Zionist agenda, after many years of debate, like any diplomatic meeting, was forged in a political fashion. The last step was to get the backing of a major world power like Britain. This is precisely what Zionist leaders set out to do. Ironically, they turned to other countries first. While the British were somewhat worried Zionists might settle with another country such as Germany, it was actually France who gave its signature to the Zionists in a document much like the Balfour Declaration. Likewise, with the support of the Vatican, Zionists won the alliance of Italy. But it would be the French document that would act like a bartering mechanism when approaching the British that would encourage them to do the same. In contrast, Palestinian efforts to appeal to the international community were less than comparative. And in times when they did, such as the Arab League Conference in Paris, issues pressing Palestine were second to the other Arab nationalist desires.



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The Israeli / Palestinian Conflict - Part 3

The Israeli / Palestinian Conflict
"Land Matters"
by Russell Cash
Originally Submitted On 04/23/2013 - EKU

Part 3 - Arab Nationalism & The Ottoman Empire

Emerging well before the 19th century, nationalist aspirations swept throughout the world with the help of France’s Napoleon. Arab Nationalism, like Zionism, had its transformations as well as its sub-branches. For the sake of simplicity and comparison this paper will refer to Arab Nationalism and Zionism emerging with reference to religious and cultural ideologies before transforming into political movements. “In the beginning, nationalism manifests itself as a cultural, defense mechanism while later it becomes an expression of the aspirations for a national state.” (Tibi, 1997)

Arabism, or Pan-Arabism, is based off an ideology that sought to unify the Mideast and North African nations under Islam. Arabism was partly already an Islamic ideal, Universalism,  as the Quran teaches that one day the entire world will be Muslim. Before Arabism and Arab Nationalism gained any political momentum there was a diverging attitude among the Arab nations under the Ottoman rule. Some believed Islam could coexist with European influence and embraced western thought as well as technology, known as Modernism. More orthodox Muslims were intolerant of the western world and believed Arabic nations should break all ties with Europe and instead concentrate on dismantling the branches of Islam that had succumbed to some secularism.

Muhammad Ali, self-declared ruler of Egypt 1805-1848, was one of the first Arabic leaders to test such nationalist desires in the Mideast. Ali, after transforming Egypt’s military and economy, had set his eyes on Syria, whose ties to the west would prove beneficial to the expanding Egyptian commerce. After the Ottoman Empire refused to give him control of Syria, he took it with force starting the Egypt-Turkish war. Although Ali is not considered the father of Arab nationalism, he believed bolstering ties with the west was important to the survival of the Arab world and placed less emphasis on Islam. His actions influenced the secularism of Arab Nationalism. Ali’s tactics were rather ingenious. Christians in Lebanon and Syria, who had prominent ties to the west, were treated as second class citizens or subjects under Ottoman rule and had to pay additional taxes. Ali won their support by promising a reform that would liberate them from their current status. Ironically, simultaneously, many Christian sects, including protestant missionaries from America, were translating English texts into Arabic, which unintentionally simplified the communication process and helped expand the western sphere of influence through literature and education; precisely what the orthodox Muslims did not want. “It is significant that the early Arab nationalists emerged not from the French but from  the American Protestant mission schools, whose activities were less directly tied to colonial aims.” (Tibi, 1997)

Emerging well before the 19th century, nationalist aspirations swept throughout the world with the help of France’s Napoleon. Arab Nationalism, like Zionism, had its transformations as well as its sub-branches. For the sake of simplicity and comparison this paper will refer to Arab Nationalism and Zionism emerging with reference to religious and cultural ideologies before transforming into political movements. “In the beginning, nationalism manifests itself as a cultural, defense mechanism while later it becomes an expression of the aspirations for a national state.” (Tibi, 1997)

Arabism, or Pan-Arabism, is based off an ideology that sought to unify the Mideast and North African nations under Islam. Arabism was partly already an Islamic ideal, Universalism,  as the Quran teaches that one day the entire world will be Muslim. Before Arabism and Arab Nationalism gained any political momentum there was a diverging attitude among the Arab nations under the Ottoman rule. Some believed Islam could coexist with European influence and embraced western thought as well as technology, known as Modernism. More orthodox Muslims were intolerant of the western world and believed Arabic nations should break all ties with Europe and instead concentrate on dismantling the branches of Islam that had succumbed to some secularism.

Muhammad Ali, self-declared ruler of Egypt 1805-1848, was one of the first Arabic leaders to test such nationalist desires in the Mideast. Ali, after transforming Egypt’s military and economy, had set his eyes on Syria, whose ties to the west would prove beneficial to the expanding Egyptian commerce. After the Ottoman Empire refused to give him control of Syria, he took it with force starting the Egypt-Turkish war. Although Ali is not considered the father of Arab nationalism, he believed bolstering ties with the west was important to the survival of the Arab world and placed less emphasis on Islam. His actions influenced the secularism of Arab Nationalism. Ali’s tactics were rather ingenious. Christians in Lebanon and Syria, who had prominent ties to the west, were treated as second class citizens or subjects under Ottoman rule and had to pay additional taxes. Ali won their support by promising a reform that would liberate them from their current status. Ironically, simultaneously, many Christian sects, including protestant missionaries from America, were translating English texts into Arabic, which unintentionally simplified the communication process and helped expand the western sphere of influence through literature and education; precisely what the orthodox Muslims did not want. “It is significant that the early Arab nationalists emerged not from the French but from  the American Protestant mission schools, whose activities were less directly tied to colonial aims.” (Tibi, 1997)

While one of Ali’s goals from the conquest was to draft more peasants into his military, his ambitions had two major impacts in the area. The first impact was a socioeconomic change, which intended to bring equality among the Arabs, Christians and Jews. This created a more complex society that was increasingly driven by a demand in agriculture. Due to better security, undeveloped land previously controlled by Bedouin tribes was now accessible and successfully turned into citrus orchards which struck British interests and helped open up another corridor of commerce. Likewise, the advances in technology along with Egypt’s influence began to change the way the land of Palestine was being cultivated. The fellahin, however, most on the run to avoid conscription into the military, stayed close to the village centers and did not benefit as much from the changes as did the Jewish, which later played an innovative role in new farming equipment. The second impact led to a cooperative effort by Bedouin tribes, fellahin villagers, and Arab religious/political leaders out of Jerusalem to unite in resistance against the Egyptian occupation. Under Ottoman rule, the Arabs had more privileges that were taken away by Ali, which in their eyes was benefiting the non-Muslim sector more so than them. Thus, the unification of these classes first embodied the Palestinian identity as a unique group located in a specific region, with more in common than just culture. “The tough rule and the new reforms led to the 1834 revolt's outbreak in the heart of the country, uniting dispersed Bedouins, rural sheikhs, urban notables, mountain fellaheen, and Jerusalem religious figures against a common enemy…. It was these groups who would later constitute the Palestinian people.” (Kimmerling, 2003)

By the 1840’s Palestine had fallen back into the hands of the Ottomans but many of the significant changes stayed intact. The increase in innovation had pitted the fellahin in a no win situation. As notable Arab families relied more on technology for agriculture, the role of the subsistence farmer began to fade eventually driving the fellahin into areas the Jewish minorities later controlled, whom they could not work or compete with. “These changes had deep, long-term effects on the Palestinian Arabs even before the Zionists arrived on the scene.” (Kimmerling, 2003)

At the mid part of the 19th century, the Ottomans were faced with two difficult issues. The first concerned how to combat the separate nationalist movements unfolding in its territories and the other was how to better govern and maintain the land it previously controlled along with keeping the agricultural improvements introduced by the Egyptians.. A series of reforms called Tanzimat attempted to address these problems by embodying the idea of the new Ottoman citizen, which intended to give the Ottomans more influence in the daily lives of its people. In short, an Ottoman Jew or Muslim was first an Ottoman over his preference of religion. In other words, all citizens, regardless of religious or cultural influences, were to be centralized under the identity of the Ottoman. However, as the later part of the century unfolded, there was a huge race between Jews and Arabs to establish their culture, predominantly through language, as being dominant and recognized by the Empire. Ironically, the new Tanzimat reforms unintentionally provided Jews and Palestinians the additional liberties to preserve their identities and seek better representation than before.

The second issue Tanzimat intended to resolve was the need for a better system of administration, local government, taxation, and control of land. Of these reforms, none had a greater impact to the Palestinian than the Land Code of 1858. As will be discussed later in detail, the code changed the way land ownership was recognized in the region and ultimately led to an abundance of transactions, claimed illegal by modern Palestinians, in which the rights to the land shifted from the Palestinians to the Jews. However, wishing not to lose out on the agricultural advances in the area and new streams of commerce between Europe, the Ottomans introduced the land code as a way of better controlling the land through taxation, as well as creating a new source of revenue. The Arab notables, wealthier families, and clans, viewed this as a prime opportunity to acquire property and exploit the fellahin. On top of this, to win back the trust of the notables, the Ottomans made many of them local officials and even armed them, which had previously been prohibited under Egyptian rule. Essentially, the Ottomans were helping arm what would become their enemies in the second Arab revolt.



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The Israeli / Palestinian Conflict - Part 2

The Israeli / Palestinian Conflict
"Land Matters"
by Russell Cash
Originally Submitted On 04/23/2013 - EKU

Part 2 - Who Are The Palestinians?

Questions still arise with respect to the Palestinians. Were they ever a sovereign body of people, or were they Bedouins turned fellahin (agricultural farmers), or were they always the province of another occupying nation? In fact, this historical debate has often added to the conflict itself. Culturally, there is no lack of evidence that a group of people equivalent to Palestinians existed in the land of Palestine as far back as ancient times. Ethnically, however, evidence suggests Palestinians composed of a melting pot of several nationalities turned immigrants who shared one thing in common, agriculture. As for true Arab Palestinians, most agree they come from nomadic Bedouin tribes that began to settle in agricultural communities as well as immigrants from neighboring Arab countries. Regardless, the push to recognize Palestinians as a sovereign body of people is evident today. We can see the divergence between the Jewish and Palestinian peoples based on their nationalist aspirations. Jews embraced the French definition of nationalism in the form of Zionism. Palestinians, as many Arabic countries, later aligned with the German and Italian philosophies, which places more emphasis on a common culture distinguishing a nation and less importance on the state, as this was the overall Pan-Arab desire, to unite all Arab nations under Islam.   “As did their German counterparts the Arabs conceived the Arab nation as an organic entity and not as a political community based on free will or nationality elective.” (Tibi, 1997)

“The Palestinians' claim is predicated on the. right of ownership evidenced by uninterrupted possession and occupation since the dawn of recorded history.” (Kimmerling, 2003) In other words, Palestinians claim they are descendants of the Canaanite, the Philistines, the Edomites, and other Semitic tribes living in the land, while at times being occupied by other nations including the Hebrew. However, the modern Palestinian identity is just as much carved out of the conflict as it is their ancient roots. “The Palestinian people were not mere victims, although, to be sure, fate has not treated them kindly, but were active participants in the creation of their people's collective character.” (Kimmerling, 2003)

Furthermore, Palestinians suffer due to the inability to choose legitimate and effective leaders. Many prominent Palestinian leaders have either ruled from underground or from behind the borders of other nations. Although part of this is historical as Palestine was often ruled by an occupying government, modern leaders such as Arafat of the PLO and Mashaal of Hamas are good examples of Palestinian leaders who tended to govern from undisclosed locations. Adding to this, especially during the British occupation, was reluctance to send ambassadors or emissaries to foreign countries to act on their behalf, instead negotiating through foreign ministers inside Palestine. This has led up to the current Palestinian situation in which they are often part of a proxy-government carrying out the initiatives and policies of other Arab nations instead of their own. Finally, lack of coordination between leaders and civilians has led to many failed policies. In respect to the events leading up to the conflict, “because the disarray, confusion and general absence of clear policy in the Arab capitals concerning the emerging refugee problem … meant … there was very little connection between what was happening in the field and what was discussed … by the Arab leaders.” (Morris, 1989)

These key principles, lack of sound leadership, lack of effective policy, neglect of history, and political indecisiveness are some of the unfortunate characteristics that allowed the Palestinian land to slip beneath the feet of the Arabs and back into the control of the Jews. That is not to say the conflict is entirely the fault of the Palestinians, but a better coordinated and organized political effort originating with Palestinians, without the reliance on other Arab nations, would have strengthened the Palestinian defense in combating British Imperialism and Zionism all together. Even for modern Palestinians, the reluctance to change this cycle on their part only inflates the conflict.

During Ottoman rule, between the time period of the first and second Arab revolt, 1834-1917, census data is considered unreliable and scholars offer their best guesses for the population of Palestine. Earlier predictions estimate “[t]he total population was probably under a quarter of a million, several tens of thousands of Jews and, of the rest, about 20% Christian.” (Kimmerling, 2003) Others place the population just before the first Jewish Aliyah to be roughly 500,000 Arabs and 50,000 Jews. (Dershowitz, 2003) The disparity proved problematic as population figures became important later on when creating policy, such as the Peel Commission and UN Resolution 242. Likewise, pro-Israeli supporters argue the influx of Jewish immigrants attracted Arab migrants to their centers of commerce in hopes of economic prosperity; thus providing evidence that many Arab Palestinians were actually immigrants like the Jews and not an indigenous sovereign body of people that had always existed in the land.

As for nationality, most Palestinians considered themselves as making up the southern part of Syria. “The largest portion of Palestine was part of the vilayet (district) of Syria and was governed from Damascus …, thus explaining why Palestine was commonly referred to as southern Syria.” (Dershowitz, 2004) Despite Arab nationalist aspirations that began to sweep the land, there was no real effort by the Palestinians to seek their own nationhood until the Jews arrived. Instead, for the most part, they either hoped the Ottoman Empire would better recognize their identity or restore their Islamic values and laws, or they would be absorbed in the much larger effort to unify the Arabic world under Arab nationalism. ‘As Auni Bey Abdul-Hati, a prominent Palestinian leader, told the Peel Commission in 1937, ‘There is no such country .... Palestine is a term the Zionists invented .... Our country was for centuries part of Syria.’" (Dershowitz, 2004)

Most of the Arab Palestinians were fellahin and lived in small agricultural communities while some more notable families lived in the cities. Although Jerusalem was largely populated with Jews and other non-Muslims, under the Ottoman reign, behind the city walls, powerful Arab Palestinian families controlled much of the commerce, religion, and regional activity. Inside the city (Jerusalem), two powerful families ruled - the Husseinis and Khalidis. For the fellahin, the village center was the source of life, religion, and politics. Rarely did they interact with officials outside their own clans and political hierarchy was centralized around the local Muslim rulers. “Clan power was largely determined by property. In many villages, land was owned collectively by the clans who had a regional dispersion and influence, with members scattered in a number of neighboring villages.” (Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949, 1989)  Oftentimes, conflicts between competing villages were more prominent than those with outsiders. Needless to say, when social and political tension began to escalate, the fellahin were less organized than their counterpart, the Jewish settlers.

Prior to the first Aliyah, Jews comprised roughly 1/10 of the population of Palestine concentrated in the major cities, particularly Jerusalem. Most of them were Sephardic Jews, non-European, who had immigrated to Palestine from countries in Asia and Africa before the nineteenth century and were hardly Zionists. In fact, like many Arab Palestinians, they were, for the most part, loyal to the Ottoman Empire.

Authors and historians tend to disagree on the relationships between the existing Jews and Arabs in Palestine. While Islam was the recognized religion of the Ottoman Empire, and most local Ottoman officials were Muslim, there appear to be time periods and scenarios in which the Palestinians and Jews were tolerant of one another, and in other times discrimination and intolerance was the policy. With so much immigration, to and from Palestine, and disagreements among historians for partisan reasons, it is difficult to determine with any accuracy the true population and their feelings towards one another. That is why many researchers attempt to study the conflict settlement by settlement. Furthermore, such integration complicates the current Jewish and Palestinian identity as they are not merely organic but rather they are both, in one part, a social and political reaction to a wave of nationalism that swept through the land beginning in the nineteenth century. “Had it not been for the pressures exerted on the Arabs of Palestine by the Zionist movement, the very concept of a Palestinian people would not have developed; and Palestinians quite accurately understand their society's essential, existential status as the direct result of Jewish political rejuvenation and settlement.” (Kimmerling, 2003)

Careful analysis of the events leading up to the 1947-1948 Israeli War of Independence provides remarkable evidence that the displacement of thousands of Palestinians from their land was driven by several factors and not so much a careful and coordinated effort carried out by the Zionist movement, at least not in the beginning. Socioeconomic changes in the region, nationalist aspirations turned political movements, technological advances in agriculture, national and foreign stakeholders driven by war, along with the culminating friction between Jews and Palestinians, all rapidly unfolded in a concoction of historical events no one entity could easily author.


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The Israeli / Palestinian Conflict - Part 1

The Israeli / Palestinian Conflict
"Land Matters"
by Russell Cash
Originally Submitted On 04/23/2013 - EKU

Part 1 - Introduction

Central to the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict is the dispute over who legitimately owns the land, commonly referred to as Palestine, which makes up the modern borders of Israel and surrounding territories. No other conflict leading to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of refugees has gained as much international attention. While the common Palestinian argument is that they were illegally dispossessed and driven from their land, the popular Israeli reply is that the land was purchased legally, mainly from Arab absentee landlords. This paper will begin by discussing the commonalities between the Palestinian Jews and Palestinian Arabs under the Ottoman Empire, their similar nationalist aspirations, their conflicting political actions, and finally their divergent national identities that emerged against the backdrop of bitter violence and war. Attention will be given to the Ottoman Land Code of 1858, its flaws that potentially led to the illegal dispossession of Palestinian land, and its application after the Ottoman Empire. Finally, the paper will conclude drawing on all the subject material showing the dispossession of Palestinian land was not due to one central policy or key actor but by many political events that culminated in the midst of socio-economic changes. After all, the people we think of today as making up modern Israel and modern Palestine are, in part, a cultivation of the conflict itself.

An integral component to nation building, especially those in development, is that of a common national heritage and preservation of one’s culture. The Jewish and Palestinian people equally and undeniably trace their historical roots back to the ancient land of Palestine. Likewise, religion is a fundamental source in deriving Jewish and Palestinian identity. Historically, Jews and Palestinians share in these similar characteristics, in that national identity is deeply rooted in their religion and the land.
It was common for the people of ancient civilizations and tribes to derive their nationality from what was believed to be divine revelation often augmented with spiritual references to the land. Israel was the name bestowed upon Jacob as he wrestled with an angel and Palestine was known as a land of milk and honey. Prophets such as Moses and Mohammed were comparative to national leaders and the revelations they received helped establish something of the rule of law. In fact, Moses tells the early Israelites several times in the Torah that any man who does not keep the law shall be cut off from his people and essentially a stranger in the land. Much of this is still relevant to modern politics, as the rule of law is what legitimizes a people and their government. We might say the curse spoken of by Moses depicts the exiled Jews of the past and illustrates the current Palestinian situation, a nation without a state.

Whether we derive modern politics from such stories or hold them as purely superstitious, it is people like the Jews and Palestinians who trace their identities back to these ancient tales. So it should come as no surprise that the land and their religion is going to be intermingled with their political action, because to them it all originates from the same source.

While Jews and Palestinians both have a rich history, preservation of it, or lack thereof, complicates understanding the conflict and one might say has only added to it. While the Jews are notable for recording and preserving their own personal and national history, the same cannot be said for Palestinians. Many historians agree that when it comes to important documents and records concerning Palestinian policies prior to the conflict and leading up to the refugee problem, they simply cannot be found. Either they don’t exist or they are hidden away in some Arab archive not available to the public. (Morris, 1989) For example, until recently, the Turkish government had sealed off Ottoman Land Code records to the public, which could have been beneficial to the Palestinians if the records can prove their land was sold illegally. Adding to this, defeat in the Arabic world is comparative to embarrassment and is often silenced, denied, or never spoken of again. Such a character flaw has proven to be politically fatal to the Palestinians as they have yet to admit their mistakes, learn from them, and break the cycle of making poor political decisions or no decision at all.

When studying the Jewish and Palestinian people comparatively, we find that both have more in common than most cultures. Yet, as we progress further away from the ancient romantic ideal of a body of people living in communion with their land and God, and ideologies lead to political movements which lead to compromise, no body of people contrasts one another so sharply. To put it simply, the Jews won the race to self-autonomy due to better political organization and mobilization. That is not to say the Palestinians have lost the race entirely; they have just opted not to finish using the methods successful to the Jews..

Who Is The Tea Party?

Written by Russell Cash
Originally submitted  Spring Semester 2013 - EKU.

At first glance, the Tea Party Movement appears reminiscent of an old ideology turned into a new nationalist movement. Importance is placed on a common national heritage, strong national identity, an original interpretation of the constitution, and the belief in a sovereign America. According to the Tea Party website, the party is founded on 15 non-negotiable core values, some of which are, “illegal aliens are here illegally, English as a core language is required, traditional family values are encouraged, and gun ownership is considered sacred.” (Tea Party, 2013) The other unmentioned values, in general, advocate a limited government and a reduction in taxes. While variants of nationalism have spread through parts of the world, the difference in most normally concerned two or more culturally unique bodies of people struggling for autonomy behind the same borders such as Israelis versus Palestinians or French Canadians versus English Canadians. In America this has never been a major issue. Instead, in the case of the Tea Party, it is about a body of citizens wishing to preserve the identity of the common American against an overpowered federal government. However, when ideologies turn political movements, the Tea Party seems as if it is just a re-fashioning of the Republican Party.

While there is much ambiguity as to when and where the party originated, many affiliates claim it started as a simple grassroots effort in the early 2000’s and culminated over time; who are merely benefactors of the original Boston Tea Party participants. Known for their anti-tax policies, others claim the movement emerged as larger US corporations began turning to third parties seeking solutions to eliminate huge corporate taxes. According to the Huffington Post, studies conducted by the National Cancer Institute have traced “the roots of the Tea Party's anti-tax movement back to the early 1980s when tobacco companies began to invest in third party groups to fight excise taxes on cigarettes.” (DeMelle, 2013) The Tea Party website and its domain registration are still owned by some of these groups that fought for the tobacco industries, leading many to question how much of a grassroots effort it really is.
A general consensus agrees that the Tea Party began taking shape during President George W. Bush’s administration. With his expansionist policies, conservative Republicans began pulling away from the major Republican Party protesting his out of control spending. With the aid of the internet, later social networking helped rally groups of likeminded individuals who felt they were being unfairly taxed without representation. Many began sending tea bags to their representatives through the mail. In 2009 the Tea Party image emerged as CNBC reporter, Rick Santelli, openly condemned the Obama administration for its poor behavior and bailing out “losers”. Within 10 days of that broadcast, tea parties were being planned in major US cities. The Tea Party had gone viral. “Should the Tea Party Movement prove a lasting phenomenon, the Santelli rant will go down in history as one of its main birth pangs.” (Pilkington, 2010)

Democrats have yet to provide a formidable Tea Party candidate although a few have run for office and lost. Most estimate the Tea Party is made up of 10%-20% democrat supporters, many maintaining the actual percentage is closer to 10%. When looking at it from a Democrat / Republican perspective, partisanship is hard to avoid. For example, the recent IRS investigation that singled out many Tea Party affiliates has been portrayed as a conspiracy by the Democratic Party, led by President Obama, to sabotage many Republicans. While the party itself has no central leadership and organization, based off the current events, to many, it would seem the Tea Party, if to be considered a Party, is simply a split off of the GOP.
It is rather difficult to determine whether the Tea Party is a social movement, an interest group, or a political party, since it has many characteristics of each, yet does not meet the basic definition of any category. According to the Tea Party website, they are a grassroots populist movement wishing to influence politics. Considering there is no central leadership or organization, this might meet the definition of a somewhat organized social or political movement. However, the Tea Party also advocates characteristics similar to interest groups. In fact, many believe the underlying supporters who fund most of the finances are a ring of big interest groups wishing to lower taxes. By definition, interest groups wish to influence policy irrespective of party affiliation without holding office. However, the vast majority of Tea Party affiliates have proven to be Republican. Likewise, although the Tea Party is not a registered political party, in some ways it acts as one. Noting one of the major differences between interest groups and political parties is that parties wish to influence elections and policy by holding office. Now that many politicians in or running for office are aligned with the Tea Party, this characteristic alone appears similar to a political party. However, considering it cannot be a legitimate party without being registered as one, it makes more sense to think of the Tea Party as a populist movement, that so far has been absorbed primarily by the Republican Party.

Opinion Polls are showing the Tea Party has dropped in popularity and is now ranking near the bottom next to the Christian Coalition. Due to recent controversies such as the IRS investigation and Michelle Bachmann stepping down, the Tea Party is starting to lose its momentum. While I agree with many of the Libertarian values, there simply isn’t enough of a threat for the Tea Party to sweep the nation like a new wave of nationalism. While religious values are respectable in their own right, there are too many Tea Party interests that if employed, would seem as a step backwards to many people. Furthermore, from a Libertarian perspective, a small government would only work optimally if the private sector operated fairly, which it never has. If the accusations are true and the Tea Party is supported by big interest groups wishing to lower taxes for those who provide products that risk the health of people. the environment, and society in general, or it originated in this manner, it would seem the Tea Party is a contradiction to its own values. I don’t see the Tea Party making any historical achievements like its predecessor but by concentrating on its success as a movement wishing to influence politics rather than control it, I believe the party could survive further into the future, potentially having greater influence on the government.